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Abstract—Embedded devices are increasingly becoming inter-
connected, sometimes over the public Internet. This poses a major
security concern, as these devices handle sensitive information
(e.g., banking credentials, personal data) or they are critical for
the safety of human lives (e.g., smoke detector, airbag system).
Security protocols need to be used in combination with a trusted
computing base to ensure that attackers cannot alter the state
of the software running on these devices to leak secrets. In this
work we focus on the problem of secure interrupt handling,
which has not been covered in related work. Our architecture
for secure interrupts build on the idea of using simple memory
isolation techniques to ensure leakage free processing of secret
information on a microcontroller. Three methods of securely han-
dling interrupts are proposed, each exploring a different trade-
off between hardware and software complexity, and interrupt
latency. Prototype implementations based on an openMSP430
softcore demonstrate the practical feasibility of our architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Embedded devices permeate our everyday lives. These de-
vices are increasingly becoming interconnected, either through
local ad-hoc networks or with the public Internet. This im-
proved connectivity brings new opportunities: the function-
ality can be updated remotely by the manufacturer, greatly
improving time-to-market, as well as allowing software from
third party providers to be installed on demand. However, this
also raises security concerns, especially if the device processes
sensitive information or performs safety critical tasks.
Today’s embedded systems lack the security technologies
that are present in modern, general-purpose platforms, such as
secure boot, virtualization, measured launch, etc. Even basic
processor features, such as virtual memory and privilege levels
(i.e., separation between user and kernel mode), are missing
in low-end microcontroller units (MCUs). The isolation of
different tasks has to be enforced by an operating system
without any hardware support. The complexity of these op-
erating systems is growing, especially if they need to include
a network stack.
In recent work, researchers have proposed hardware changes
to improve the trustworthiness of low-end MCUs by adding a
lightweight root of trust. Kumar et al. [1] designed a system
that provides a number of protection domains within the
address space and introduced the idea of using a safe stack to
guard against stack corruption by misbehaving tasks. Strackx
et al. [2] proposed a simple program counter based mem-
ory access control system to isolate software modules. The
SMART architecture [3] supports dynamic remote attestation
with a software routine stored in immutable ROM. Noorman
et al. [4] designed a security architecture called Sancus, that
supports strong process isolation and hardware based remote
attestation. Schulz et al. [5] designed a security architecture
called TrustLite, that provides hardware-enforced isolation of
software modules with support for secure exception handling,
and communication between protected modules.
ARM TrustZone [6] is a technology that is available on
a number of commercially available ARM processors. Each
processor has two virtual processors, with different privileges
and a strictly controlled communication interface. Intel Soft-
ware Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) [7] provide ISA extensions
that provide multiple protected domains, called enclaves, in
which software can operate, free from external observation or
modification of the code and data. However, these solutions
are only available on high-end processors.
The majority of the related works, which are applicable to
low-end MCUs, require their security functionality to execute
uninterruptedly. For SMART this is a strict requirement, other-
wise an attacker can move malware around during attestation
to avoid detection [8].
Embedded devices regularly operate in a real-time envi-
ronment and need to remain responsive to external stimuli
(e.g., a medical implant, or a safety system in a car), even
while performing time-consuming security-critical tasks (e.g.,
generation of cryptographic key or digital signature). Preemp-
tive schedulers can provide real-time scheduling support for
MUCs. It works by temporarily interrupting a task, without
requiring its cooperation, and resuming it at a later stage. Se-
cure scheduling is useful to enable the on-schedule execution
of critical tasks. The scheduler is isolated from other software
by keeping it inside a protected domain, and it makes use of
interrupts to perform scheduling. Secure I/O processing can be
used to perform leakage-free processing of received I/O data
in the protected domain. When I/O data arrives, interrupts are
used to invoke a routine that is located in the protected domain.
The routine can then process the I/O data without leaking it’s
contents to the other software running on the processor.
In this work, we provide a mechanism for handling secure
interrupts that is compatible with the Sancus architecture. The
proposed architecture allows interrupt service routine (ISRs)
to be located in either the secure or the non-secure domain of
the microcontroller. This makes it possible to use the processor
for real-time processing, secure scheduling, and secure IO, as
tasks running in any security domain can be interrupted. We
present a generic solution and compare the results of three
implementation options.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we present the
general architecture of our security-enhanced MCU, which
is based on design principles of the related work. Next, we
describe a general scheme that can be used to allow secure
interrupts. Subsequently, we discuss three implementations
with different design trade-offs. Finally, we discuss our im-
plementation results, and present the conclusion.
II. ARCHITECTURE
This section discusses the security architecture of the sys-
tem. We first describe the attacker possibilities, followed by a
description of the security enhancements for domain isolation
and security domain switching.
A. Attacker model
For the attacker model we assume that the adversary is ca-
pable of obtaining full control of the state of the software and
data. This has the following implications. First, the attacker is
capable of modifying any writable code, e.g., a buffer overflow
attack. Second, the attacker can read, and write to any memory
region that is not explicitly protected by the MCU. Third,
the attacker may have compromised the underlying layer of
software, e.g., the OS.
We also assume that the attacker is not capable of perform-
ing any hardware-based attacks, including placing probes on
the memory bus, performing a hard reset of the system, and
inducing hardware faults.
B. Domain isolation
The system is partitioned into two different domains, like
in [3], [6]: (1) the non-secure domain where regular activities
occur, and (2) the secure domain where all processing of
sensitive data occurs. If an operating system is present on
the embedded device, it will typically reside in the non-secure
domain; this system for instance contains a network stack or
a real-time scheduler. Both the program memory and the data
memory are partitioned into their respective secure and non-
secure parts. For the sake of simplicity, we only consider a
single secure domain, but our scheme can easily be extended
to multiple secure domains [1], [2], [4].
The MCU makes a distinction between the two domains
depending on the program counter (PC). When the PC is in
the address range of the secure program memory, the system
is considered to be inside the secure domain. When the PC is
in the address range of the normal program memory, then the
system is considered to be in the normal domain.
We assume a low-end microcontroller without a memory
management unit (MMU) and hence no support for virtual
memory. Instead a basic memory protection unit (MPU) is
inserted between the MCU and the memory. This unit enforces
(1) program counter based access control [2] on both the data
memory and the program memory, and (2) guards the entry
into the secure domain by allowing only a single point of entry.
The program counter based access control feature ensures
that only the normal program memory and data memory is
accessible while the system is in the normal domain. However,
when the system is inside the secure domain, both the secure
program memory and secure data memory also becomes
accessible to the processor.
The single point of entry into the secure domain, from
hereon referred to as the single entry point, is a mechanism
that ensures that the secure domain can only be entered at a
single address which is located in the secure program memory.
Once the program counter has entered the secure program
memory at this address, it is allowed to transition to any
other address inside either the secure, or non-secure program
memory. However, once the program counter points to an
address that lies outside of the secure program memory, the
secure domain can only be entered again via the single entry
point. This feature ensures that secure code cannot be (ab)used
to extract secure data. In return oriented programming [9]
an attacker selectively combines chunks of secure program
memory, which could lead to unintended information leaks.
The hardware enforcement of the single entry point guards
against such type of attacks.
The enforced access control is shown in Table I. The secure
data memory is inaccessible when the MCU is in the non-
secure domain. Furthermore, the non-secure domain only has
read access to the secure program memory, except for its first
address. This memory address has execute permission, and
acts as the only entry point to the secure domain.
In order to expose multiple functions from the secure
domain to the non-secure domain, a jump table is used, as
also proposed in [1], [4]. The identifier of a specific function
is stored in a register before jumping to the single entry point.
The code at the single entry point then jumps to the correct
function based on the identifier passed inside the register.
TABLE I
ACCESS RIGHTS ENFORCED BY THE MEMORY PROTECTION UNIT.
Program Memory Data Memory
non-secure secure non-secure secure
Secure domain rwx rwx rw- rw-
Non-secure domain rwx r-x∗ rw- ---
∗Execute access only available on the single point of entry
C. Context switching between domains
We define a domain switch as a transition from one security
domain to another. Context switches within a domain (e.g.,
multithreading, user/kernel mode switching) are not consid-
ered in this work.
Two type of context switches can be distinguished. The first
type are instructions that alter the program counter, including
the call instruction, a return from a call with the ret
instruction, a return from interrupt (reti), or with the jmp
instruction. The second type are hardware events such as
interrupts, processor exceptions or a reset.
The memory protection unit enforces the isolated memory
regions of the two security domains. However, these domains
still share the same set of registers. Therefore, special care is
needed such that information does not leak through registers.
Consequently, the general-purpose registers need to be cleared
before a domain switch to the non-secure domain.
A call stack is typically used to pass parameters, store
return addresses, and for local data storage. A microcontroller
maintains a stack pointer (SP) that points to the top of the
stack. In our solution, each domain has its own stack, which
is located in its data memory address space, and a dedicated
SP register. The MCU switches between the two registers
depending on the security domain. We chose this option for
the sake of simplifying domain switches, and providing better
performance. An alternative method, which is used in [4], is to
perform stack pointer switching in software by storing pointers
to the top of each stack in fixed data memory addresses; this
solution requires only a single hardware register.
III. SECURE INTERRUPTS
This section discusses the scheme for handling secure
interrupts. We first describe a typical interrupt mechanism
of low-end MCUs and then present a modified scheme for
supporting interrupts with multiple security domains.
A. Standard interrupt mechanism
An interrupt is a signal generated by hardware or software
to indicate to the processor an event that needs immediate
attention (e.g., timer, peripheral device, etc.).
Each interrupt can have its own unique interrupt service
routine (ISR). The addresses of the ISRs are stored in the
interrupt vector table (IVT), which is located at a specific
program memory address.
When an interrupt occurs, the following steps are generally
performed: (1) the currently executing instruction is com-
pleted, (2) the PC that points to the next instruction (which
we call the resume point), is stored on the stack, (3) the status
register (SR) (which contains the status flag bits, e.g., zero,
carry, and overflow) is pushed on the stack, (4) the interrupt
with the highest priority is selected if multiple interrupts
occurred during the last instruction, (5) the SR is cleared and
further interrupts are disabled, and (6) the address stored in
the IVT is loaded into the PC, causing a jump to the ISR.
When the ISR is finished, it resumes the interrupted task with
the reti instruction. This instruction restores the SR and PC
from the stack to continue execution at the point where it was
interrupted.
Some processor architectures supported nested interrupt. In
this case, interrupts can be re-enabled inside an ISR, causing
any interrupt that occurs inside this ISR to interrupt the routine,
regardless of its priority.
B. Domain isolation support
We have extended the microcontroller with the notion
of isolated protection domains. As mentioned above, it is
crucial that no information leakage occurs during a domain
switch from the secure to non-secure domain. With instruction
based domain switching, the content of registers is cleared
in software just before the transition occurs. However, this
strategy cannot easily be applied with an interrupt based
domain switch.
There are three main design challenges. First, a hardware
interrupt can occur at any point during execution. This implies
that there are four possible scenarios: (1) a non-secure task is
interrupted by a non-secure ISR, (2) a secure task by a secure
ISR, (3) a non-secure task by a secure ISR, and (4) a secure
task by a non-secure ISR. The first two are trivial to handle, as
no domain switch is required; however, the latter two require
a domain switch.
Second, it should be possible for the software to choose
whether to resume the interrupted task, or to execute another
task. This allows for the scheduling of secure/non-secure tasks,
as will be explained in section III-E.
Finally, the scheme must still comply with the hardware
restricted entry into the secure domain. The ISR is unaware
whether it is interrupting a secure or non-secure task. Normally
it will resume execution with the reti instruction. However,
this instruction cannot be used to directly perform a domain
switch into the secure domain, as it would invalidate the single
entry policy. If this restriction was not in place, then it could
lead to an attacker circumventing the single entry policy by
pushing a secure domain address onto the stack, followed by
issuing a reti.
C. Interrupting non-secure task with secure ISR
In this scenario, an ISR that resides in secure program
memory, is invoked from within the non-secure domain. Here
we propose to handle this scenario with the scheme shown in
Fig. 1. The secure domain is entered at the single entry point.
We propose to solve the problem of invoking the secure ISR
from the non-secure domain by adding an entry to the single
entry jump table (section II-B) for each secure ISR. Each
entry is responsible for invoking a different ISR. The general-
purpose registers should be cleared before a domain switch
from the secure domain to the non-secure domain. However,
the transition into the secure domain does not require the
general-purpose registers to be cleared, because they do not
contain any secrets.
Non-secure task
is interrupted
Store program counter
and status register on
non-secure stack
Store general
purpose registers
on non-secure stack
Enter secure domain
at single entry point
Execute ISR
Clear general
purpose registers
Restore general
purpose registers
from non-secure stack
Resume execution
at resume point
from non-secure stack
Fig. 1. A general scheme for invoking secure ISRs from the non-secure
domain. The green blocks reside in the non-secure domain, whereas orange
blocks reside in the secure domain.
D. Interrupting secure task with non-secure ISR
In this scenario, an ISR that resides in non-secure program
memory, is invoked from the secure domain. Here we propose
to handle this scenario with the scheme shown in Fig. 2.
A domain switch from the secure domain to the non-secure
domain is required. Therefore, the general-purpose registers
need to be cleared before switching to the non-secure domain.
We propose to solve the problem of resuming the interrupted
secure task from the non-secure domain, by adding an entry
into the single entry jump table (section II-B) to resume
execution at the resume point.
Secure task
is interrupted
Store resume point
and status register
on secure stack
Store general
purpose registers
on the secure stack
Clear general
purpose registers
Execute ISR
Enter secure domain
at single entry point
Restore general
purpose registers
from secure stack
Resume execution
at resume point
from secure stack
Fig. 2. A general scheme for invoking non-secure ISRs from the secure
domain. The green blocks reside in the non-secure domain, whereas orange
blocks reside in the secure domain.
E. Scheduling
Microcontrollers often have real-time operating require-
ments where scheduling of tasks are essential. When using a
preemptive scheduler, interrupts are generated with a hardware
timer, to transfer control back to the scheduler. The scheduler
then selects the next task to execute, or resume, based on a
ranking system. The mechanism that allows for interrupting
a secure task with a non-secure ISR also enables preemptive
scheduling.
A secure scheduler, as described in [10], enables the on-
schedule execution of critical tasks that are running on a
partially compromised system. This type of scheduler prevents
components under the attacker’s control from changing the
execution times of other applications. The scheduler is kept
isolated from the rest of the software by placing it inside
the secure domain. When an application is preempted or an
exception occurs, control is transferred to the scheduler which
resumes execution of the pending applications. Therefore, the
mechanism that allows for interrupting a non-secure task with
a secure ISR also enables secure scheduling.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
This section presents the implementations that were made in
order to demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed scheme.
First, we describe the architecture of the processor that we
extended with security features. Afterwards, we present three
prototype implementations with different design goals, and
different design trade-offs in terms of cycles, area, and code
size.
A. MSP430
Our implementation is based on the low-cost, low-power TI
MSP430. It is a 16-bit MCU with a Von Neumann architecture,
and a single 16-bit address space for program and data
memory. It has no external memory bus, and the amount of
on-chip memory is limited to 16 kB RAM and 256 kB flash
memory. It has eleven general-purpose registers (R4-R15),
with R0-R3 serving as a program counter, stack pointer, status
register, and constant generator.
Most interrupts on the MSP430 architecture are maskable,
and can therefore only cause an interrupt when they are
enabled, and if the general interrupt enable (GIE) bit is set
inside the status register.
A multiplexer is used to select between the normal SP and
the secure SP, depending primarily on the value of the program
counter.
One of the design problems we faced, was that ISRs have
a return control flow that depends on the domain that the
ISR was invoked from. We decided that each ISR should use
the same return mechanism, regardless of the domain it is
invoked from. We solve this by invoking all ISRs that require a
domain switch in a special manner, which we call an emulated
interrupt. Instructions are used to emulate what the hardware
does when an interrupt occurs, by pushing the SR and the
address of a return trampoline onto the stack, followed by a
jump to the ISR. The invoked ISR executes, and returns with
a reti. Since the address of the return trampoline is still on
the stack, the reti will invoke the return trampoline.
B. Software-based implementation
The goal of the software-based implementation is to use the
minimum amount of hardware features. As such, we opted to
make use of a different IVT for each security domain. Since
the ISRs have control flows that depend on the current security
domain, the idea is that each IVT will serve as the starting
point for each of these control flows.
An IVT is normally populated with the addresses of ISRs,
each associated with a different interrupt. As we now have
an IVT for each security domain, we populate it with (1) the
addresses of ISRs that exist in the same security domain as
the IVT, and (2) the addresses of software routines that will
initiate the control flow to invoke ISRs located in the other
security domain.
The second IVT, which we refer to as the secure IVT,
is stored at a fixed address in secure program memory. A
hardware feature selects between IVTs, depending on the
current security domain.
Upon entering the secure domain at the single point of entry,
the value stored in R15 is used to determine which function
in the jump table to execute.
1) Interrupting non-secure task with secure ISR: The archi-
tecture is shown in Fig. 3. After storing the general-purpose
registers, a call is made to the entry in the single entry
jump table that corresponds to the current ISR. The secure
ISR is invoked with an emulated interrupt. This is followed
by clearing the general-purpose registers, and returning (ret)
from the call, which causes a transition back to the normal
domain. The registers are then restored from the secure stack,
and the resume point is used to jump to the point where
execution was interrupted.
Interrupt non-secure task
Store registers
push R15-R4
R15 = ISR number
call single entry
Emulated interrupt
push addr(trampoline)
push SR
jmp ISR
ISR...
reti
trampoline:
Clear registers
clr R4-R15
ret
Restore registers
pop R4-R15
reti
Resume non-secure task
Fig. 3. Software-based flowchart for invoking a secure ISR from the non-
secure domain. The green blocks reside in the non-secure domain, whereas
orange blocks reside in the secure domain.
2) Interrupting secure task with non-secure ISR: The ar-
chitecture is shown in Fig. 4. After storing, and clearing the
general-purpose registers, the non-secure ISR is invoked by
means of an emulated interrupt. This is followed by storing a
value of zero in R15, and jumping to the single entry point.
The value of zero in R15 correspond to a jump table entry
that is responsible for restoring all registers from the secure
stack, and using the resume point to jump to the point where
execution was interrupted.
Interrupt Secure task
Store and clear registers
push R15-R4
clr R15-R4
Emulated interrupt
push addr(trampoline)
push SR
jmp ISR
ISR...
reti
trampoline:
Call jump table
R15 = 0
jmp single entry
Restore registers
pop R4-R15
reti
Resume secure task
Fig. 4. Software-based flowchart for invoking a non-secure ISR from the
secure domain. The green blocks reside in the non-secure domain, whereas
orange blocks reside in the secure domain.
C. Hardware-based implementation
The goal for the hardware-based implementation is to
minimize interrupt latency by adding more functionality to
hardware. As a further goal we try to minimize the amount of
additional hardware. The architecture of this implementation
is very similar to the software-based implementation (sec-
tion IV-B), with the exception of the following: (1) a single
IVT is used, and (2) the clearing, storing, and restoring of
general-purpose registers is now done in hardware.
A single IVT is used to store the addresses of the ISRs that
can be located in either domain. The extended interrupt logic,
shown in Fig. 5, takes care of any additional processing that
needs to be done if a domain switch is required to invoke an
ISR.
Fig. 1 and 2 show that both schemes require: (1) saving
the general-purpose registers to the stack, and (2) restoring
the general-purpose registers from the stack after domain
switching back to the interrupted task’s domain. We propose
to solve (1) by further extending the interrupt logic to save
the general-purpose registers on the stack before performing
the domain switch to the other domain. We further propose
to solve (2) by introducing a new instruction that restores all
registers from the current stack.
Complete instruction Select highestpriority interrupt
Context
switch
required?
push PC
push SR
push R15-R4
push PC
push SR
jmp ISR
Secure
domain? clr R4-R15
push addr(trampoline)
on NS stack
push SR
on NS stack
jmp ISR
R15 = addr(ISR)
jmp single
entry address
no
yes
yes
no
Fig. 5. The modified hardware-based interrupt logic.
D. Hidden registers optimization
We also propose a performance optimization to improve
interrupt latency. For this optimization, the amount of visible
registers inside the ISR is restricted to n. This improves
interrupt latency because less registers need to be cleared,
saved and restored from the stack, but without the hardware
cost of using shadow registers. To ensure that the remaining
11− n general-purpose registers do not leak any information,
all read and write operations on the remaining registers will be
blocked. The compiler/programmer needs to ensure that only
the visible n registers are used in the ISR, as the remaining
registers are unusable.
This optimization can be done on either the hardware-based
architecture (section IV-C), or the software-based architecture
(section IV-B), and will require the following features to be
activated when inside a domain switched ISR: (1) the saving
and restoring of the general-purpose registers on the stack is
limited to only n registers, and (2) the register file is modified
to disable read and write access on the remaining registers.
V. RESULTS
We extended the openMSP430 [11] softcore to create our
prototype implementations. This softcore is fully compatible
with the TI MSP430 MCU, and executes code generated by
any MSP430 toolchain in a near cycle-accurate way. The
openMSP430 softcore was configured to use the following
settings: a 10 MHz clock, 4 kB of data memory, 8 kB of
program memory, a hardware multiplier, and a single timer.
We used the Digilent Atlys, Spartan-6 LX45 based FPGA
development board to test our results.
Table II shows the amount of 6-input LUTs, and registers for
the unmodified openMSP430, and the three different designs.
The synthesis optimization goal was set to “area”.
TABLE II
A SUMMARY OF THE HARDWARE COSTS FOR THE DIFFERENT DESIGNS.
Design LUTs Registers
Unmodified 2231 1185
Software-based 2241 1187
Hardware-based 2417 1219
HW-based Hidden registers 2420 1220
Table III compares the number of cycles required to perform
an interrupt-based context switch. An interrupt that does not
require a domain switch needs 6 cycles to pass control to the
ISR, whereas 5 cycles are required to resume an interrupted
task with the reti instruction. Pushing a register onto the
stack requires 3 cycles, whereas popping a value from the
stack requires 2 cycles. For the cycle times it is assumed that
jump table logic requires only 4 cycles.
TABLE III
CONTEXT SWITCHING CYCLE TIMES FOR AN INTERRUPTED TASK. THE
NUMBER OF HIDDEN REGISTERS IS INDICATED WITH n .
Context switch SW HW
Interrupt S to NS 71 9+n
Return NS to S 43 14+n
Interrupt NS to S 54 13+n
Return S to NS 52 10+n
Interrupt ∗ 6 6
Return ∗ 5 5
∗ No domain switch occurs here.
The results show that the software oriented technique has
the slowest context switching time, and further requires the
least amount of hardware modifications. Our hardware-based
design has a moderately good context switching time with
a slightly bigger hardware cost. The hidden register method
proved to have the fastest context switching time, at the cost of
a small amount of additional hardware, and a reduced number
of available registers in the ISR.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a scheme that allows interrupts
to be securely processed on a processor that uses program
counter based isolation techniques to protect sensitive data.
We designed three implementations, each with different design
trade-offs, and made the prototypes by extending the open-
MSP430 softcore. In all three cases, both hardware, as well
as software techniques are required to make the prototypes.
Our result show that secure interrupts are feasible on low-
end microcontrollers as the amount of extra hardware that
is required is minimal, and the cycle overhead from domain
switches is acceptable.
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